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Abstract
Our article relocates the debate about creative labour to the terrain of peer-to-peer
interneting as the paradigmatic form of nonmarket – social – production. From Yann
Moulier Boutang we take the point that creative labour is immaterial; it is expressed
through people connected by the internet. Drawing on two social systems thinkers,
Francis Heylighen and Wolfgang Hofkirchner, we transpose this connectedness up to a
conception of creative labour as a supra-individual collective intelligence. This intelli-
gence, we argue, is one of the internet’s emergent properties. We then present a model
of internet development that flags the potential of digitally-evoked collective intelligence
to facilitate what the Marxist philosopher George Caffentzis calls ‘postcapitalist com-
moning’. Yoking together systems theorizing about the internet and socialist envisioning
of social transformation, we identify two sets of internet tools for coordination that can
assist with the convivial reconstruction of society along the lines of peer-based
production.
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Introduction
One of the new economic sociology’s greatest insights is that economic activity under
capitalism is embedded within dense networks of social relations (Granovetter, 1985;
Swedberg, 2003). Yet, the social substrate can no longer be thought of as a mere support
system for the operation of markets and hierarchies; it is the seedbed for new forms of
value-generating productive activity. With the development of nonmarket, non-
hierarchical, peer-based production spurred by the internet, the everyday lifeworld is
being transformed – perhaps now more than ever before – into a productive site. Based on
digital architectures of cooperation and platforms for collaboration, new principles for
ordering production are developing that are not automatically and unambiguously sub-
sumed by – and indeed have the potential to transform – existing norms and relations of
production (Rifkin, 2014). Arguably, what is emerging is no less than a new social mode of
production that is upending market-based forms of economic ordering and their attendant
property rights frameworks, which have been central to the economic institutions of
capitalism since they historically emerged in the West (North and Thomas, 1973).
Hilary Wainwright suggests that non-propertarian peer-based production opens up
new opportunities ‘to release, develop and extend the creativity of labour in its broadest
sense’ (Wainwright, 2012). If interlinked processes of digitalization, informationaliza-
tion, and mediatization permeate the social sites of peer production, then creative labour
is encapsulated within a digital envelope. Commenting on the rise of the internet, the
systems theorist and doyen of creativity researchers, Keith Sawyer, detects a shift ‘away
from the Western cultural model of creativity – away from individualist conceptions and
toward collaborative, sociocultural conceptions of creativity’ (Sawyer, 2012: 429). In this
article we explore one such conception: creative labour as a form of collective intelligence
emergent through the internet. We approach creative labour from the standpoint of a broad
philosophy of the social mind in which the internet is regarded as an expression of the
noosphere: an emergent global realm of human thought (Lévy, 2000).1
Taking our cue from Wainwright, we detach the discussion of creative labour from the
‘creative industries’ per se (cf. Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011), and relocate it to the terrain
of peer-to-peer ‘interneting’ as the quintessential type of social – nonmarket – production.
But we give the screw an extra twist. In line with Fumagalli’s (2011) tenth thesis on con-
temporary capitalism, we believe that the phrase ‘creative labour’ implies challenging
capital’s dominance through collective action. Consequently, we focus on creative labour as
a force for transformational change rather than on opportunities for its artful expression
within existing enclaves of peer-based digital (social) production. For capitalism to be
unseated, as Kliman (2012) points out, new relations of production must already be in
existence in incipient form at least; but there must also be a political will to spread these
relations – they cannot be sustained within isolated commons havens. We argue that (a) new
relations are evident in the social mode of production; and (b) the internet supplies social
mobilizing tools that have the potential to extend these relations through ‘postcapitalist
commoning’ or ‘expanding the commons into new areas of social life’ – as Caffentzis (2013:
90–1) puts it so well. There is one caveat we want to stipulate upfront. We do not try to
position creative labour within the class structure, but rather talk in more general terms of
immaterial labour as the central form of creative labour (Hardt and Negri, 2009).2
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Our discussion proceeds as follows. After reviewing debates about social produc-
tion’s capacity to displace capitalism, we identify two perspectives on creative labour as
internet-based collective intelligence. The first stresses the ‘labour’ side of the creative
labour equation; it is epitomized in the work of Yann Moulier Boutang, who propounds
the thesis that collective intelligence is exploited in cognitive capitalism. The second
perspective applies systems thinking to the internet in a version of sociocybernetics.
Creativity is regarded as a function of an emergent supra-individual collective intelli-
gence, with the internet emerging as the basis for a Global Brain. Each perspective, we
argue, has its limitations. Moulier Boutang’s work has a strong economizing streak and
lacks a fully theorized conception of how the internet’s emergent systemic properties are
augmenting human creativity. Understanding these properties is where sociocybernetics
excels; but the idea of labour as a productive force, and recognition of capitalism’s very
existence, risks erasure within the more techno-utopian strands of global brain theorizing
(cf. Goertzel, 2002). Holding these shortcomings in abeyance, we combine the insights
of the two perspectives for conceptualizing creative labour. The resulting synthesis we
apply as a method for understanding the internet’s potential to foster social production by
challenging capitalistic production norms.
Social production and the institutions of capitalism
Peer-based social production’s potential as an alternative to market and organizational
hierarchical economic coordination has risen to prominence within academic literature
in the last decade. In The Wealth of Networks – a pathbreaking depiction of a sea change
in production regimes – Benkler (2006: ch. 4) described peer production within the
internet commons as being decentralized, modular (comprising modules or packets of
tasks that can be worked on independently by many diverse contributors), and highly
granular (based on small-scale modules requiring little by way of time and effort from
each individual participant). While his analysis was ahead of its time, Benkler took for
granted that capitalism will continue to be the institutional framework within which
peer-based production occurs. Increasingly, scholars and social commentators are
questioning this assumption.
Whether digital capitalism is fundamentally challenged by, or seamlessly able to
absorb, new forms of peer production is a matter of current debate (Orsi, 2009; Schiller,
2011). Coming down on the side of challenging capitalist norms, Bauwens (2012) argues
that a process of prefiguration is happening:
The new mode of peer production has features that prefigure a new productive system in the
sense that the sharing of knowledge, code or design essentially follows a logic similar to
communism as described by Marx: anyone can contribute, and anyone with access to the
network can access the resource. (Bauwens, 2012)
In a short manifesto-like book, Siefkes (2008) provides a point-for-point contrast
between peer production and capitalist production. His conclusion is as follows:
a society based on peer production will be characterized by manifold cooperation both
within and between peer projects. We have seen that a society is possible where all
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economic activity is arranged in this way. In this society, production will be driven by
demand and not by profit. There will be no need to sell anything and hence no unem-
ployment; competition will be more a game than a struggle for survival; there won’t be a
distinction between people with capital and those without, or between people living in a
center and those living in the periphery. In this society, it would be silly to keep your ideas
and knowledge secret instead of sharing them; and scarcity will no longer be a precondition
of economic success, but a problem to be worked around. (Siefkes, 2008: 132, emphasis in
original)
Although their writing is thought-provoking, Bauwens and Siefkes present a set of
largely ahistorical prognostications. Recent – more rigorous – work by Jakob Rigi and
Jeremy Rifkin renders the ascendency of social production more conditional.
Rigi historicizes peer production, like many commentators dating its emergence to the
1980s free software movement, but setting it within a conceptually solid Marxian
foundation as a new mode of production within the totality of a society’s relations of
production that comprise a social formation. Simply put, peer production ‘is a new
historical, though still emerging, mode of production, and not merely an epiphenomenon
on the margins of capitalism’ (Rigi, 2013: 397). Moreover, the extent of this nascent
mode of production’s encroachment upon capitalism is contingent upon ‘social and
political struggles’ aimed at eliminating the remaining institutions of private property
(Rigi, 2013: 412).
Struggle is notably absent from Rifkin’s (2014) book-length treatment of peer pro-
duction. He assumes peering will, without any mass political mobilization, eventually
crowd out capitalism. We disagree with Rifkin’s incrementalist view of social change
and his preference for marginalism over value theory. Yet, the potential he sees in the
fast-developing Internet of Things – a multitude of devices and people connected in real
time ‘allowing every human being and everything to communicate with one another in
searching out synergies and facilitating interconnections’ (Rifkin, 2014: 13) – provides a
steppingstone to the type of collective intelligence that we explore in this article. Rifkin
also usefully extends the historical contextualization of peer-based production back into
the social commons. The feudal commons gradually dissipated and then later, in the 19th
century, what emerged were ‘new kinds of self-governing Commons’ including chari-
table societies, cooperatives, and voluntary associations involved in the peer production
of housing, credit, medical services and other pillars of civil society (Rifkin, 2014: 17).
His point is that the Internet of Things, to the extent that it ‘enables billions of people to
engage in peer-to-peer social networks’, and thus ‘lateral peer production’, brings ‘the
social Commons out of the shadows, giving it a high-tech platform to become the
dominant economic paradigm of the twenty-first century’ (Rifkin, 2014: 18).
The remainder of our article addresses the sociopolitical implications of the Internet
of Things potentially ‘connecting everyone and everything in a global neural network’
(Rifkin, 2014: 77). Arguably, the internet facilitates the paradigmatic forms of social
production Rifkin identifies, including the creation of digital materials, knowledge
goods, shareable green electricity, and prosumer-led 3D printing. But the internet also
supplies the tools for channelling creative labour in the form of a collective intelligence
that has the potential for framebreaking institutional change; and, likewise, the tools for
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coordinating social production. As an exercise in social envisioning, our subsequent
discussion of these internet potentials has an affinity with the socialist ‘design, pre-
requisites, transitions’ paradigm advocated by Laibman (2013).3 We turn now to outline
two – not incompatible – ways of understanding creative labour in terms of collective
intelligence evoked by the Internet of Things.
Moulier Boutang at economism’s limits
Moulier Boutang’s discussion of creative labour and collective intelligence is embedded
within his broader thesis of cognitive capitalism. The thesis is about how capitalism is
morphing from an industrial to an intelligence and knowledge-based accumulation
regime. Simply stated, value-creation in the industrial era was based on units of labour-
time expended within the firm’s confines, the equivalence of which was, in the final
instance, determined quantitatively by the market. By contrast, under cognitive capit-
alism value increasingly derives from hard to quantify ‘intelligent, inventive and inno-
vative labour’ that ‘mobilises the cooperation of brains in networks’ (Moulier Boutang,
2011: 55). The internet and creativity is at the core of this capitalism, in which capital
‘accumulation is based on knowledge and creativity’ expressed in digital networks
(Moulier Boutang, 2011: 56). In this framework, ‘the Internet, as the network of net-
works, is a resource that has no equivalent’ (Moulier Boutang, 2011: 65).
In line with the work of Hardt and Negri (2009), Moulier Boutang argues that
immaterial labour comes to the fore. To be sure, he is quick to point out that physical
labour:
does not disappear, but it loses its centrality in favour of a cooperation of brains in the
production of the living by means of the living, via the new information technologies,
of which the digital, the computer and the Internet are emblematic. (Moulier Boutang,
2011: 57)
In short, immaterial labour is creative, and creative (immaterial) labour is a function
of collective intelligence that stems from ‘the cooperative labour of human beings joined
together in networks by means of computers’ (Moulier Boutang, 2011: 57). Here is a
succinct formulation of this proposition:
the resource that capitalism seeks to prioritise today is collective intelligence, creativity
distributed through the entirety of the population. (Moulier Boutang, 2011: 34)
Free software production is cognitive capitalism’s prototypical model of production,
the paradigmatic example of creative labour, and the primary site of ‘cognitive play’
where people cooperate (Moulier Boutang, 2011: 90–91). This is one of cognitive
capitalism’s contradictory features. At the same time as (surplus) value is being created
and siphoned off from creative activities, the peer-based nature of production opens a
production space beyond the firm and market that is potentially liberating.
The whole notion of cognitive capitalism is not without its critics (Starosta, 2012). For
our purposes, however, the important thing is the link Moulier Boutang makes between
capitalism and creative labour as collective intelligence expressed through the internet.
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The idea of creative labour as a function of collective intelligence encapsulates a key
form of creative labour in the age of interneting. Moulier Boutang’s consistent focus on
the ‘labour’ side of creative labour is all the more important given the fact that co-
creation is tapped by firms seeking new sources of value based on the exploitation of
citizen-labourers’ creativity (Zwick et al., 2008).
To the extent that Moulier Boutang identifies the internet as the centrepiece of
accumulation in contemporary capitalism, he is a rare breed even among heterodox
economists. But the source of this insight, his economism, is the very thing that also
constrains his analysis. Though he regards the internet as ‘a creation of human intelli-
gence in society’ and recognizes its recursive capacity to ‘modify human cooperation
and the production of collective intelligence’ (Moulier Boutang, 2011: 152, 37), he fails
to push these points to their maximal limits. Significantly, he does not transpose the idea
of creative labour as collective intelligence up to the level of an emergent property
inherent to the internet itself as a self-organizing and evolving system (cf. Hofkirchner,
2007). Moulier Boutang simply does not entertain the idea that there are ‘emergent
system properties that are not possessed by the [system’s] parts’ (Sawyer, 2009: 73).4 To
be sure, in a tantalizing series of remarks early in Cognitive Capitalism, he chomps at the
economistic bit as he talks of the noosphere:
For the first time human beings have moved higher in society, having a brain that is equipped
and extended by networked computers. . . . Collective intelligence is suddenly multiplied,
even as it touches the frontiers of the modification of living and of its production and the
reinterpretation of its position in biosphere and in the universe. (Moulier Boutang, 2011: 36)
Ultimately, however, he is unable to move beyond the limits economic discourse
imposes upon him. For him, collective intelligence is just the sum of its parts, and
computers are merely tools in the hands of users. They supply no creativity.
We want to take several steps further than Moulier Boutang does. We turn to Global
Brain theorists who upscale collective intelligence by understanding it as an emergent
property of a self-organizing organological system in which there is no firm bar between
human creativity and computer creativity. In turn, we maintain, self-organization – in the
sense of automation and augmentation of social processes and functions – provides a
powerful mechanism for mobilizing support to extend social production. What is lacking
in this social organology perspective, however, is precisely what Moulier Boutang
recognizes: that the digital islands of social production are immersed in a sea of capitalism.
Creative labour as emergent collective intelligence
The Global Brain is a shorthand label for understanding society as a vast, decentralized
neural network with the inherent capacity for self-organized problem-solving. This idea
predates the internet and has spawned a voluminous literature (Maturana and Varela,
1980; Stock, 1993; Mingers, 1995; de Rosnay, 2000). The variant we explore is asso-
ciated with the Belgian cybernetics expert Frances Heylighen, who helped found the
Principia Cybernetica website and currently is Director of the Global Brain Institute.5
His work helps us to reconceptualize creative labour as internet-based collective
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intelligence from a systems thinking standpoint, and to explain how the internet can
stimulate collective action. This, we argue, is important for accentuating the ‘labour’
element of creative labour as a force for challenging capitalism.
Heylighen differs from Moulier Boutang in that he thinks a creative form of collective
intelligence is emerging from the internet that is not merely the sum of its parts; and the
creative parts are not just people in their capacity as internet users (or produsers) but also
computers connected by the internet. Creativity is thereby repositioned as an expression
of collective intelligence. Reframing Surowiecki’s (2004) popularizing ‘wisdom of
crowds’ notion, Heylighen explicitly theorizes this intelligence in systems-theoretic
terms. He believes that ‘a self-amplifying explosion of [globally distributed] intelli-
gence’ through people connected by the internet is resulting in a form of collective
intelligence that is the basis for the development of a Global Brain (Heylighen, 2013: 3).
This entity, in turn, is the nervous system of a Global Superorganism that is self-
organizing (capable of autopoiesis) and evolves (Heylighen, 2007).
This techno-futurological vision of society as an autopoietic superorganism is, for our
purposes, less important than Heylighen’s conception of collective, creative intelligence
as an emergent property that has nonhuman elements. From the standpoint of under-
standing the ‘creative’ aspect of creative labour, the important point is that the distinction
between humans and computers as agents no longer holds. Distributed – collective –
intelligence emerges from multi-agent systems comprising people and computers con-
nected by the Internet of Things (Heylighen, 2013). This intelligence is distributed
because it is the result of a multitude of agents making contributions to the collective.
And the agents are not just people but computers (Heylighen, 2012). Stated in more
familiar sociological terms, they are ‘actants’ with agential properties (Cerulo, 2009).
This has profound implications for understanding the locus of creativity. As one author
puts it:
as we develop more capable socially intelligent computational systems and systems that
enable collective intelligence among humans and computers, the boundary between human
creativity and computer creativity blurs. (Maher, 2012: 67)
Heylighen dissolves human creativity, and by implication creative labour, into a
sociotechnical system that has the recursive ability to reproduce and improve upon itself.
This collective intelligence is ‘intelligent’ and ‘creative’ in the sense that it has the
potential to solve social problems. The upshot is this: human creativity melds with
computer creativity and collective intelligence is seen as an emergent systems-level
property of the internet, which is not reducible to the individual intelligences that
comprise it (Heylighen, 2012). Enhanced problem-solving abilities are the net result.
This collective intelligence emerges through coordinated action prompted by ‘chal-
lenges’; the key coordination mechanism is ‘stigmergy’ (Heylighen et al., 2013). How it
works can be illustrated with respect to Wikipedia:
The principle is that the work of one individual (e.g. an edit of a Wikipedia text) leaves a
public trace (e.g. a change in the corresponding web page) that can stimulate one or more
other individuals to continue the work (e.g. add further details or correct the grammar).
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Thus, independent contributions build further the one on top of the other, producing a
collective result much richer and more complex than could have been achieved via any
traditional, centralized form of organization. There are no obvious limits to such a self-
amplifying process of contributions eliciting further contributions. (Heylighen, 2013: 7)
Despite a gradual decline in the number of active Wikipedia contributors since 2010,6
studies assembled in the Collective Intelligence Handbook (Malone and Bernstein, in
press) suggest that Wikipedia still rates as the exemplar of peer production and collective
intelligence.7 The most interesting point for us is the connection Heylighen makes
between collective intelligence, spurred by the mechanism of stigmergy, and collective
action through social technologies – including social media. These media are prime
examples of ‘mobilization systems’ from which collective action and collective intel-
ligence develop (Heylighen et al., 2013).
Collective action is sparked by the inbuilt features of social technologies. The
iterative editing characteristic of Wikipedia is combined with ‘challenge propagation, as
challenges (incitements to act) are transmitted from person-to-person along a techno-
logically supported network (e.g. using social media), until the challenge is completely
dealt with’ (Heylighen et al., 2013: 131). This process accumulates collective intelli-
gence by aggregating the results of iterative refinements:
Aggregation of results in a communal memory is the essence of collective intelligence, as it
synthesizes the diverse points of view, experiences and knowledge of a group of individuals
into a ‘wisdom of the crowd’. (Heylighen et al., 2013: 131)
Heylighen and his co-authors have used simulations to show that the propagation of
challenges (posted material, that is) within a Facebook-type social medium can support
the accumulation of distributed intelligence that maximizes the ability to solve problems
(Heylighen et al., 2012). This is a game-changer for how we understand the new media
environment in which creative labour can become a vector for framebreaking institu-
tional change. In the next section we seek to cash out these insights, tempered by
awareness that capitalism is absent from Heylighen’s systems thinking framework.
Internet tools for consensualization and convivial
reconstruction
In this section we talk about the internet as supplying a set of tools for consensualization
(Web 2.0-based social media) and tools for the convivial reconstruction of society (Web
3.0 and beyond) from capitalism to peer-based social production. We derive the names of
these tools from Laibman (1995, 2007) and Illich (1973) respectively. We begin with
social media, and write at more length about it. This is because social media embodies
much of what we see as a new logic for creative labour, when understood as a form of
collective intelligence based on a ‘spontaneous coordination mechanism’ (stigmergy)
that serves as a starting mechanism for collective action (Heylighen, 2013: 20). Our
discussion, of necessity, is general because we deal more with the possibilities for digital
platforms to channel the societally transformative potential of creative labour, rather
than specific instances of digital activism or ‘e-tactics’ (Earl and Kimport, 2011: 8). To
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recapitulate, our goal is to conceptualize creative labour as a systemic outgrowth of the
internet’s emergent dynamical – powerful and ever-improving – capacities for the
accumulation of collective intelligence.8
Social media as tools for consensualization
Following van Dijck (2013: 8), we use social media as a cluster concept to refer to an
‘ecosystem of interconnected platforms and applications’, based on Web 2.0, that
encompass ‘social network sites’ – such as Facebook – and sites where user-generated
content is created and exchanged (Wikipedia, the Google-owned YouTube and the
like). Ten core principles underlie the functioning of social media platforms which
differentiate them from traditional broadcast mass media and other forms of commu-
nication and collaboration (see Appendix).
As a social mobilization technology, social media can assist with what Laibman
(1995) describes as ‘consensualization’ – ultimately manifest in the collective will
necessary to challenge existing capitalist norms of production and to advance alternative
production models such as peer-based social production. Heylighen says that the
mechanism he identifies as being the key to creativity as collective intelligence – stig-
mergy – has the potential to ‘align the scattered wishes, desires and intentions of millions
of people, thus gathering the momentum, engagement and ‘‘political will’’ necessary to
tackle truly global problems’ (Heylighen et al., 2013: 138). Tantalizingly, he talks of the
potential of social mobilization technologies to assist with the formation of ‘a broad
consensus on what to do next’ (Heylighen et al., 2013: 140). Though he takes the
capitalistic framework of market-based coordination between competing firms as a given
(Heylighen, 2007), his analysis of social mobilization technologies is nonetheless con-
gruent with the idea of consensus formation as a precursor to instituting the norms and
practices of social production.
From Laibman (2007: 15) we take the idea that consensualization is a precondition for
the transition from capitalism to a non-capitalist (in his case a socialist, in ours a social)
mode of production. We follow his lead by using
the term consensualization to indicate the complex process of communication, shared
activism, development of empathy: the shaping of diverse and highly articulated individual
wills and motivations into a coherent social unity. This unity is, and should be, a fuzzy
reality, not to be confused with any sort of monolithic identity of wills. The point is to
achieve a general quality of agreement concerning the overall shape of the social process,
and its projection into the future. (Laibman, 1995: 87)
As a social mobilization technology that can – through the spontaneous coordination
mechanism of stigmergy – potentially align diverse views on the way forward, social
media has potential to achieve what Laibman (1995: 85) calls the ‘coordination of wills’.
There is, of course, no particular reason why this coordination should be in the
direction of any form of institutional change, let alone generating large-scale opposition
to capitalism. Social media is dominated by profit-seeking firms, including Facebook,
Twitter, and Google through YouTube and Googleþ (Fuchs, 2013). As a con-
sensualization tool, privately-owned social media can just as easily function to foster a
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consensus that supports, rather than challenges, the capitalist relations of production in
which the firms that own these platforms are immersed. In the act of maximizing profits
social media firms block – albeit indirectly and unintentionally – the transformation of
collective intelligence into a political will that seeks to transform existing economic
arrangements. These blockages operate both at the level of social media code (or soft-
ware) and the level of social media content. We will briefly consider each in turn.
The self-organizing stigmergy coordination mechanism that Heylighen identifies as
supporting the development of collective intelligence is situated at the level of code. Yet
the code underlying private social media platforms is governed by proprietary algorithms
that are closely guarded secrets. In the case of Facebook they are geared to the imple-
mentation of business strategies for maximizing advertising revenues. The code is
beyond everyday user control and it can stymie digital activism as a medium for the
stigmergic propagation of challenges that elicit fast, cumulative responses and activity
cascades. A recent study identifies a fundamental
mismatch between the commercial logic of platforms such as Facebook and the needs of
activists using social media as public information infrastructure. The fundamental problem
is that social media governance, both in terms of code-as-law and the rule of policies and
user terms, is driven by necessary commercial considerations, namely monetization.
Companies must appeal to broad classes of users and advertisers, which both can help
activists and lead to policy changes that constrain them. . . . As the platforms were not
designed to cater to activist users, changes in rules and architectures can have negative,
unintended consequences for activists. (Youmans and York, 2012: 317)
At the level of users’ perceptions and understandings, social media code has wider
effects too. Morrison (2005: 321) says that when creativity is understood ‘in terms of
agents taking decisions’ then ‘the decision can also be to do nothing, to remain the same’.
This, he argues, can be explained by factoring into systems theory the concept of habitus:
culturally supplied perceptual frameworks and dispositions. Lewis et al. (2010: 356)
identify social media habitus, based at the level of code, which reinforces existing
norms. Drawing on Bourdieu, they say that:
the online social media ‘habitus’ generated by and within these categories of perception and
action generates a ‘doxa’, a system of thought within which the social world appears natural
and common sense. (Lewis et al., 2010: 356)
Facebook’s code makes personal information visible, and gives the platform the
appearance of being wholly decentralized while at the same time obscuring ‘any
awareness of a central hub’ (Trottier, 2012: 40). If Bauman and Lyons (2013: 11) are
correct, this is post-panoptic surveillance’s sine qua non, as forceful authorities can
retreat ‘into sheer inaccessibility’ – in this case behind the social media platform’s
architecture.
The post-panopticizing surveillant properties of capitalistic social media subject users
to consumerist imperatives. At the level of content, the drawing off of user data to
promote advertising targeted to a user’s consumer profile leads to the reconstitution of
users’ social imperatives in accordance with extant market relations. Users are thereby
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subsumed into libidinal economies of consumption (Stiegler, 2010), and their creativity
exploited as co-creators of value (Thrift, 2006). Post-panopticizing surveillance con-
tinually threatens to reconstruct social media users, in line with market requirements, as
producer commodities whose user data is sold on to firms for advertising purposes and
then re-presented (in the sense of returning back to the users) in the form of targeted
advertising (Andrejevic, 2011). Arguably, this process leads to the commodification of
social media users themselves and exposes them to exploitation in the specifically
Marxian sense, thus perpetuating social inequality (Fisher, 2012).9 By fostering con-
formity to a scopophilic culture that prizes being seen (Mateus, 2012), the surveillant
properties of commercial social media threaten to dull the internet-channelled
institutional-transformative impulse of creative labour.
Conceptually wrapping social media habitus within systems thinking protects against
the risk of overstating social media’s hegemonic role. Agency is implicit within the
concept of social media habitus; just as it is implicit within a systems theoretic per-
spective on the internet and social media, and especially so when social media habitus is
embedded within this perspective. From the standpoint of complex systems theory,
habitus can be seen as constraining and enabling (Fuchs, 2003). This delicate balance is
nicely captured by Sarah Lewis and her co-authors who insightfully observe that social
media
enable some forms of social interaction, but also limit the visibility of many other possi-
bilities that may lie hidden in the gaps inherent within such systems of meanings. Herein lies
opportunity – for the hidden possibilities that form through these disjunctures enable
changes in the system, even as they are hidden by its own logic. (Lewis et al., 2010: 356)
They go on to argue that social media’s power ‘lies not in its ability to offer individual
expression anytime anywhere so much as in its yet-to-be-realized potential to foster
collaborations, on a scale and in tighter time cycles than ever seen before’ (Lewis et al.,
2010: 358). While they are talking specifically about learning processes, the idea of yet-
to-be-realized potentials succinctly captures the point we are making about social media
as a mechanism for coordination of wills. It dovetails with our view of the internet’s
potential as a mechanism for coordinating social production on an economy-wide scale.
It is to this latter point that we now turn.
Tools for convivial reconstruction
When Laibman (1995: 84, emphasis in original) says that ‘coordination of wills . . . is a
necessary precondition for efficient coordination of activities’, he means that con-
sensualization is the necessary platform on which any new system of production will be
built. Any non-capitalistic system of production – whether social or socialistic – implies
that people accept certain ‘possibilities and constraints and willingly act within that
range’ (Laibman, 1995: 84). Social production is unlikely – at least in the short term – to
usher in Heylighen’s (2013) ‘Garden of Eden’ scenario of limitless abundance. In the
transition from capitalist to peer production there is much scope for economic trade-offs.
This brings to the fore the internet’s role as a coordination mechanism for determining
the frontiers of production possibilities and deciding between different economic goals.
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We proceed now to nestle the distinction between coordination of wills and coordi-
nation of activities within a systems-theoretic perspective on social media and the
internet as a self-organizing system. For this, we turn to the third wave of system
thinking within sociology which focuses on emergent properties of dynamical social
systems (Sawyer, 2009).10 We draw on work by Hofkirchner (2007), who uses this
approach to describe the internet as a self-organizing, evolving system. Retaining the
notion of collective intelligence developing through the internet as an emergent phe-
nomenon, he argues that ‘the next step required . . . to enhance collective intelligence is
extending co-operation in cyberspace with the aim of enhancing co-operation in the real
world’ through ‘communities of action supported by means of the Internet’ (Hofkirch-
ner, 2007: 497). We combine his stage model of how the internet is developing with the
idea of the coordination of wills (through social media) as a precondition for coordi-
nating activities along the lines of peer-based social production.
To do this, we use Illich’s (1973) concept of tools for the convivial reconstruction of
society towards a form of cooperative – non-capitalistic – production. Our yoking of a
systems theoretic view of the internet to radical notions of social change may, to some,
seem an unusual move. Yet there is complementarity at a meta-theoretical level because
Illich’s discussion is littered with systems-theoretic concepts such as entropy and
homeostasis (Illich, 1973: 49, 78). Convivial reconstruction implies achieving dynamic
equilibrium that trades off the benefits of institutional change against the constraints of
new forms of production. In Figure 1 we substitute two things into Hofkirchner’s stage
model: Laibman’s distinction between the two forms of coordination (of wills and
activities) necessary for transforming production regimes, and Illich’s concept of con-
vivial reconstruction.
Hofkirchner sees the internet as having developed in three (by no means discrete)
stages which align with the digitalization of three key information-based social pro-
cesses: cognition, communication, and cooperation. The articulation of these processes
‘resembles the build-up of a complex system’ as ‘to co-operate you need to communicate
and to communicate you need to cognize’ (Hofkirchner, 2007: 495). Where Web 1.0 had
hypertext-based websites that assisted cognition, Web 2.0 has enabled social media
which Hofkirchner refers to as ‘social technologies’ that create platforms for commu-
nication and collaborative learning. In the foregoing discussion, we identified these
media as potentially providing the basis for an algorithmically assisted (stigmergy-
based) coordination of wills to promote the acceptance of peer production as a viable
alternative to capitalist production.
The next stage is cooperation, which Hofkirchner conceptualizes merely in terms of
Rheingold’s (2002) ‘technologies for cooperation’. By contrast, we see this as the level
at which the collective intelligence accumulated through technologies of mobilization
and other Web 2.0 platforms can be used as a basis for the convivial reconstruction of
society. This is the province of Web 3.0 providing what we have called Tools for
Convivial Reconstruction.11 This potential development of the internet would make
possible the coordination of peer production, which needs some element of centralized
coordination running in parallel with the inherently decentralized nature of peer-based
activity. Were it to be completely decentralized, social production would amount to
an anarchistic set of economic arrangements.
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There are many possibilities – all of them hypothetical – for how Web 3.0 might enable
the coordination of activities in the peer economy. We single out just one: the E-Coordi-
Net that Laibman (2007: 169) postulates as a coordination mechanism for reaching
agreement on ‘such things as the growth-consumption trade-off’. This would be an
internet tool that could enable ‘continuous referenda’ – such that ‘popular votes on eco-
nomic parameters could be registered and tabulated continuously’ (Laibman, 2007: 169).
More broadly, it would function as an automated system for accumulating and ‘processing
the continually shifting flows of economic data’, setting social prices of production, and so
on (Laibman, 2007: 168). This is but one possible outcome of creative labour as a form of
self-organizing collective intelligence emergent from the internet, which supplies the
tools by which to overcome the limitations of market-based socio-economic ordering.
Conclusion
The concept of a social mode of production refers to an array of peer-based production
arrangements based on internet-enabled social technologies that bring the issue of
Figure 1. Implications of internet development for societal transformation. Adapted from
Hofkirchner (2007: 496).
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creative labour to the fore. In this article we have argued for the potential of this labour,
defined as internet-based collective intelligence, to extend and augment social produc-
tion. Our recasting of creative labour in systems theoretic terms, as a function of med-
iatized social collaboration, displaces the conceptualization of this labour from
interiorizing discourses of creativity as expressing inner drives or the heroic entrepre-
neurial impulses of individuals (cf. Florida, 2012). Arguably, this better reflects how the
internet, and the various forms of openness it sustains, democratizes creativity by
challenging established hierarchies of knowledge production and eroding the cognitive
division of labour.
There is no reason to think that subsequent iterations of the internet will solve all the
world’s problems, and we are not saying that they will. But, at minimum, we have shown
complementarity between the idea that the internet supplies tools (technologies) to
challenge capitalist production and to coordinate the peer economy, on the one hand; and
longstanding debates within socialist circles over participatory involvement in economic
activities, on the other. The internet answers, at least in part, the question of how to
enable ‘willful and thoughtful individuals’ to ‘mutually shape and acknowledge their
core beliefs about the quality of social life’ and how to achieve the purposeful demo-
cratization of economic processes (Laibman, 1995: 85).
Still, is there not some element of dissonance between conscious, deliberative
decision-making and the marshalling of public sentiment in the algorithimicized,
technologically-mediated recesses of the internet? Sebastian Vehlken, for one, sees little
that is liberatory about collective or ‘swarm’ intelligence. Labelling it merely as part of
‘the current media culture’, he doubts ‘the grass-roots-democratic ‘‘nature’’ of human
techno-collectives’ (Vehlken, 2013: 126). As ‘operationalized and optimized multitudes
have emerged from the uncontrollable data drift of dynamic collectives’, the present is
becoming a totalizing machinic nightmare from which, as be bluntly puts it, ‘there can be
no escape’ (Vehlken, 2013: 127).
In a succinct book simply titled The Immaterial, originally published in French in
2003, André Gorz presciently envisions a starkly contrasting scenario. To be sure, he
debunks the whole notion of artificial intelligence displacing human intelligence, dis-
missing talk about devising a ‘global algorithm’ that produces worldwide peace as
nonsense (Gorz, 2010: 167). Though Gorz criticizes post-human vistas of social evo-
lution, he insists that there is every reason to think collective intelligence is paving the
way for a new form of society. He foresees an increasingly ‘intelligent society’ based on
rising collective intelligence in which:
Free Networks could be said to be the common matrix – a non-hierarchical structure in
centreless horizontal networks ceaselessly producing and organizing themselves, based on
the principle of ‘democracy by consensus’ in which any proposal is considered, debated,
enhanced and further elaborated by everyone’s contributions. (Gorz, 2010: 126)
As the Internet of Things evolves and connects up evermore people and digital
devices, the networks in question will undoubtedly be self-organizing hybrid networks
comprising both human and computer elements. More work is needed to explore the
interplay between the emergent properties of these networks and the coproduction not
14 Thesis Eleven
 at University of Waikato Library on September 19, 2016the.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
just of material or immaterial commodities, but new forms of sociality and principles of
social organization.
Appendix
Ten Core Principles of Social Media
1. Participation: user-participation taps projects of mass collaboration and mobi-
lizes the community to generate collective intelligence; user-generated content
is the basis of social media: ‘the user is king’.
2. Collective intelligence: users ‘collect’, share and modify user-generated con-
tent, which is stored and can be iteratively updated.
3. Transparency: each participant gets to see, use, reuse, augment, validate,
critique and evaluate others’ contributions, leading to collective self-
improvement.
4. Decentralization: from the logic of ‘one to many’ that characterizes industrial
media to the flat structures of ‘many to many’ that characterize social media –
interactive anytime, anyplace collaboration independently of other contributors.
5. Virtual community: sociality based on ‘conversations’ that are relationship-
seeking.
6. Personalization: personalization refers to the process of tailoring and customi-
zation of digital processes based on the individual’s preferences and behaviour.
7. ‘Design is politics’: this feature is an explicit recognition of the dimension of
power in design: how a social media site is designed determines how people will
use it.
8. Emergence: emergence refers to self-organizing social structures, expertise,
work processes, content organization and information taxonomies that are not a
product of any one person.
9. Revisability: social media can be altered, unlike industrial media; it can be
infinitely updated and added to and allows group editing and individual
contestation.
10. Ownership: social media are accessible and available at little cost, unlike
industrial media that require large investments.
Source: Besley and Peters (2013: 4–5), based on a compilation from many works
including Benkler (2006), Rheingold (n.d.), and Bradley (2010).
Notes
1. Our article’s title, ‘Noosphere Rising’, is from an episode of the television series Touch (Series
1, Episode 7), starring Kiefer Sutherland (as Martin Bohm) and David Mazouz (playing his
autistic and presciently observant young son, Jake Bohm). The series is about a form of global
connectedness and supra-individual consciousness periodically glimpsed by Jake. For an
account of this particular episode, see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2362873/.
2. Regarding the issue of how immaterial labour might map onto class groupings or fractions, see
Fuchs (2011: 284).
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3. While one referee was concerned that what we say about the internet is futuristic, our article
sits squarely within a tradition of socialist envisioning of technological capabilities and new
social institutions whose contemporary exponents include David Laibman. We do not,
however, subscribe to his stagist approach. For an overview, see Laibman (2007).
4. This problem arises because Moulier Boutang is entrenched within an economic perspective
associated with what Sawyer (2009) labels the ‘second wave’ of systems thinking that does not
properly theorize emergentism.
5. See the biographical entry at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Heylighen. For information
about the institute, see http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/GBRAIN-L.html.
6. For this trend, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File: ActiveWikipedians.PNG.
7. The editors have made a draft of the Handbook fully available online at: http://thegovlab.org/
the-collective-intelligence-handbook-an-open-experiment/. In particular, see Chapter 8 by
Benkler, Shaw and Hill.
8. In subsequent work, we will address the capacity of internet-based self-organization to rival
the self-organizing properties of markets.
9. Because zero wages are paid to social media users, and using wages as a surrogate for
variable capital in the classical Marxian rate of exploitation (surplus value/variable capital),
users are not merely exploited but hyper-exploited. For a discussion along these lines, see
Fuchs (2010: 191).
10. The first wave of social systems theory, according to Sawyer (2009), is Parsonsian; the second
wave draws on general systems theory (including the work of the Austrian biologist Ludwig
von Bertalanffy). Neither of these waves tackled the issue of ‘how successive symbolic
interactions among autonomous individuals result in the emergence of collective phenomena’
(Sawyer, 2009: 21–2). This is the third wave’s primary concern.
11. One of Hofkirchner’s co-authors, Christian Fuchs, distils the difference between Web 2.0 and
Web 3.0 down to a greatly increased capacity of the internet to function as a coordination
mechanism for the orchestration of activities, as opposed to being merely a platform for
communication (Fuchs et al., 2010).
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